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Baby Boomer Retirement Security:  
The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth 
 
Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
The standard economic model of wealth accumulation posits that consumption decisions 
are made in a life-cycle framework, where consumption-smoothing requires one to save during 
the working years to support consumption after retirement.1 Specifically, this framework models 
the consumer as maximizing his discounted lifetime expected utility such that consumption flows 
and wealth stocks at each point depend on his permanent income, i.e., anticipated lifetime 
resources, as well as preference parameters.  To do so, the consumer must understand present 
discounted values, the difference between nominal and real amounts, and be able to project 
expected future labor income, pensions and social security benefits, retirement ages, and survival 
probabilities, among many other factors. These requirements are inherently complex and 
demanding.  
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate how successfully individuals plan for retirement, 
whether financial literacy is associated with better planning, and whether retirement 
preparedness is associated with these behaviors.  Specifically, in what follows, we provide new 
evidence regarding people’s economic knowledge and planning, and how these are associated 
with saving behavior.  The analysis uses two cohorts of data from the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) in 2004 and 1992 to evaluate wealth on the verge of retirement. Three questions are 
of central interest: 
1) What do the level and composition of wealth tell us about the financial position of the 
Baby Boomers compared to prior cohorts? 
2) Are more sophisticated and financially literate individuals more likely to plan for 
retirement?   
3) Does planning affect wealth accumulation? 
                                                 
1 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a review. 
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 To address these issues, we first assess the level and distribution of wealth holdings of 
Baby Boomers on the verge of retirement, along with those of a comparable age group in 1992. 
Looking at both cohorts, we find that the median Boomer has more wealth than its precursor 
cohort a dozen years before, but those in the lowest quartile are less well off. We also show that 
housing equity is a key component of retirement assets, though the concentration of wealth in 
one asset leaves many Boomers vulnerable to fluctuations in the housing market. By contrast, 
holders of stocks, IRAs, and business equity are concentrated in the top quartiles of the wealth 
distribution.  We next assess alternative explanations for differences in household wealth, 
focusing on respondents’ planning efforts and the financial literacy they bring to solving the 
retirement problem.  We show that financial literacy influences planning behavior and that 
planning, in turn, increases wealth holdings, even after controlling for many sociodemographic 
factors. Inasmuch as planning is an important predictor of saving and investment success, we 
believe we have identified an important explanation for why wealth holdings differ so much 
across households, and why some people enter retirement with very low amounts of wealth. 
 
An overview of pre-retirement wealth 
Our analysis draws on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a rich and detailed 
nationally representative survey of Americans over the age of 50 (and their spouses of any age). 
This survey was designed to track assets, liabilities, health, and patterns of wellbeing in older 
households both over time and across cohorts.2  Beginning in 1992, the survey has been 
                                                 
2  http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
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administered every two years.3  In this paper, we compare and contrast the experiences of what 
we call the “Early Baby Boomer” (EBB) cohort, where at least one household member was born 
between 1948 and 1953, with an earlier cohort first interviewed in 1992 (the 1992 HRS cohort). 
Both cohorts are selected to be in the 51-56 age range at the time of the interview. The older 
sample totaled 4,580 and the EBB sample totaled 2,635 after we deleted a handful of households 
with missing observations or zero income. All statistics reported use HRS household weights and 
all values are expressed in 2004 dollars.  
Wealth for these respondents on the verge of retirement is measured in terms of their self-
reported household total net worth; separately we also report home equity and non-housing/non-
business wealth. Total net worth is a broad concept; it includes respondents’ checking and 
savings account balances, certificates of deposits and T-bills, bonds, stocks, IRAs and Keoghs, 
home equity, second homes and other real estate, business equity, vehicles, and other assets, 
minus all debt. Home equity refers to respondents’ net equity in their homes after subtracting 
mortgage debt. Non-business-non housing wealth is obtained by subtracting home and business 
equity from total net worth.4  
The distribution of total net worth for both cohorts appears in Table 1. The wealth 
distribution is very skewed: Boomers’ median net worth is $152,000, while the mean is two and 
a half times greater (approximately $390,000).  The fact that wealth is distributed quite unevenly 
is also seen in the fact that Boomers in the third quartile have more than 10 times the wealth 
($400,000) of households in the first quartile ($36,000). We also note that Boomers hold more 
                                                 
3 A 90-minute core questionnaire is administered to age-eligible respondents and their spouses; in addition, the 
“financially knowledgeable” respondent is asked to report information on household finances.  
4 Two other important components of total retirement wealth not included here are Social Security and pension 
wealth. For a detailed analysis of the importance of pension and Social Security wealth, see Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1999). In future data releases, these components may be calculated from administrative records linked to 
respondent records, but they are not currently available. 
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wealth than the earlier cohort, but the improvement has not been uniform: in fact, Boomers in the 
lowest quartile of the wealth distribution have less wealth than their precursor counterparts.5  
One reason Boomers have more net worth is because they have more housing equity; 
overall, the median amount of housing equity is $68,000 for the EBB group, with a mean value 
twice this amount. At the mean, one-third of the early Boomers’ wealth is held in the form of 
home equity, and at the median the fraction is close to half. That is, many Americans currently 
on the verge of retirement have accumulated little wealth outside their homes. Note that housing 
equity still represents a crucial component of net worth (close to one-third) for even the 
wealthiest respondents.6 In the third column of Table 1, when both housing and business wealth 
are excluded from the net worth computation, a sizeable fraction of the Boomers turn out to have 
either zero or negative net wealth (for instance, due to credit card and other loans). Indeed, if we 
focus only on net worth without housing and business equity, the median Early Boomer holds 
less wealth than the prior cohort.  A final observation from Table 1 is that the wealthiest 
households in both cohorts are disproportionately business owners; when we omit business 
equity from net worth, the right tail of the wealth distribution displays much less extreme 
values.7 
The heterogeneity in wealth observed for both cohorts remains large even within socio-
economic groups. For instance, Table 2 (Panel A) depicts total net worth by educational 
attainment and highlights the very steep wealth-education gradient; the median Boomer 
respondent with less than a high school education has less than $22,000 in total net worth, 
whereas respondents with a high school degree have almost four times as much, and respondents 
                                                 
5 This confirms earlier findings (Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Moore and Mitchell, 2000). 
6 Given that home values are self-reported, one may wonder about the accuracy of these reports. Bucks and Pence 
(2006) compare household self-reported housing data with lender-reported data. They find that most homeowners 
appear to report their house value and rate of house price appreciation accurately. 
7 See also Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Hurst and Lusardi (2006). 
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with a college degree have fourteen times as much. It is also important to highlight the dispersion 
in wealth within given education groups. For example, considering only those with a high school 
degree, respondents in the third quartile hold more than 15 times as much wealth as those in the 
first quartile. The wealth gradient is flattest (but still sizable) for the most educated; the third/first 
quartile wealth ratio is 5 times among those with a college degree.  
Other pronounced wealth differences are also evident in Table 2 where we break down 
the results by race and ethnicity, marital status, and sex. One striking result within the EBB is 
that the median White household reports close to $200,000 in total net worth, whereas the Black 
household’s net worth value is one-eighth as large ($25,000), and the net worth of Hispanic 
households is one third as large ($56,000). The third/first quartile wealth gradient at 7.3 for 
Whites is much flatter than for Blacks and Hispanics. Another large difference stands out among 
different marital status groupings.  For instance, the median married respondent has over four 
times the total net worth of the median nonmarried respondent (where the latter group includes 
separated, divorced, widowed, and never married individuals). Lack of resources is also a stark 
concern for the nonmarrieds, with the bottom quartile having only $3000 in total net worth.  
Respondents with children (most of the EBB sample) have accumulated more wealth than the 
childless, and male respondents report much higher net worth than female respondents. 
Comparing Boomers with their predecessors, we see that some demographic groups are 
doing worse in terms of their wealth holdings when compared to the earlier cohorts (Table 2, 
Panel B). For example, EBBs without a college degree display lower wealth than the 1992 
cohort. Wealth holdings are lower throughout the wealth distribution. Blacks in 2004 have 
accumulated less wealth compared to 1992, and so have those households in the lower quartiles 
of the income distribution. 
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Next, we turn to the composition of wealth. Table 3 shows again that one of the most 
important assets held by both cohorts is the home. Not only are most EBB and members of the 
1992 cohorts homeowners, but home equity accounts for a third of total net worth among the 
EBBs.  When we sum together home equity and other real estate (an asset most prominent 
among wealthier households), the amount of wealth accounted for by total real estate is 47 
percent for EBB, while it was 43.8 percent for the earlier cohort. Thus, exposure to the housing 
market has risen for the EBB group, as compared to the 1992 HRS cohort. 
 Two other important assets in the portfolios of both cohorts are stocks and IRAs or 
Keoghs. However, most households do not hold large amounts of wealth in this form; the share 
of wealth accounted for by stocks is 12 percent among Boomers, up from 8 percent among the 
HRS cohort. The share of IRAs and Keoghs is similar but slightly lower (10.6 percent for the 
EBBs and 7.5 percent for the HRS cohort). If all IRAs were invested in equities, more than 22 
percent of EBBs’ wealth would be invested in stocks, while only  about 16 percent of the earlier 
cohort’s wealth was invested in the stock market. Thus, in addition to holding more housing, 
Boomers are also more exposed to the stock market than the HRS cohort.  
Vulnerability to wealth shocks 
As just noted, housing wealth emerges as a key component of saving for many 
Americans on the verge of retirement. Not only is the rate of homeownership very high for 
Boomers, but their homes are also one of the few assets held broadly, across educational levels 
and across all ethnic/racial minority groups. In view of the upward trend in housing prices over 
the last decades, some have suggested that housing is good way to finance retirement, 
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particularly for Boomers who have benefited from widespread appreciation of home equity. 8  
Yet macroeconomic and monetary policymakers should be concerned with this reliance on 
housing values to finance retirement, since a sharp interest rate rise could induce a “hard 
landing” in housing values, and many Boomer households could then experience substantial 
wealth losses.  
To help evaluate the importance of this possibility, we have modeled what would happen 
to Baby Boomers if housing prices in each region were to return to their 2002 levels. Inasmuch 
as home prices rose substantially over the 2002-3 period, this exercise would imply an average 
national housing price drop of 13.5% (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 2005).  
Our simulation computes how much wealth would change for the EBBs if real estate prices (of 
home, second home and other real estate) declined by as much as they rose in the respondent’s 
own Census region over the period.  Our results suggest that a shock of this magnitude would be 
substantial for Boomers; 10% of their total net worth would be lost.  Furthermore, for the median 
household, net worth would fall by 13.7%. This finding clearly reinforces the fact that Boomers 
are quite vulnerable to housing market shocks. 
A related issue to consider when assessing EBB wealth is whether this generation 
anticipates using home equity to finance their retirement.  Prior waves of retirees have not 
downsized their homes at retirement nor have they taken up reverse mortgages (Venti and Wise 
1990, 1991).  There is, however, some evidence that home equity is a buffer used in the event of 
widowhood and to finance long-term care.  And not surprisingly, whether one includes or 
excludes housing equity has a substantive effect on measures of Baby Boomers’ financial 
wellbeing (Bernheim, 1993; CBO, 1993).   
                                                 
8 For instance, Edmunds and Keene (2005) urge readers to “use your home to finance your retirement…Forgot to 
save for retirement, but bought a house? Saved a lot and also bought a house? Whatever your situation, (we) can 
show you how to best use your home equity for a long and prosperous retirement.” 
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In view of the rise in home equity values for Boomers, the role of housing in financing 
retirement has the potential to be even more important than in the past. Of course, we do not 
know yet whether and how this cohort will draw down home equity in retirement, though it may 
be of interest to ask households what they expect to do. To this end, we devised a special module 
for the 2004 HRS,9 where we asked homeowners the following question:  
“On (a) scale from 0 to 100, where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 equals 
absolutely certain, what are the chances that you will sell your house to finance 
your [(and your (husband/wife/partner)’s] retirement?” 
 
Answers to the question are reported in Figure 1 which summarizes results for all respondents 
aged 50 and over in the 2004 HRS module (not just those in the EBB group); the results are also 
similar for respondents age 50-70. Some 60% of homeowners affirmed that they did not plan to 
sell their homes to finance retirement, and almost 70% of respondents felt there was a minimal 
(10% or less) chance they would sell their homes to pay for retirement.  In other words, most 
older Americans do not plan to sell their homes to finance additional retirement expenses, though 
naturally this store of wealth helps cover housing consumption needs. In what follows, we both 
include and exclude net housing equity in the measures of wealth considered.10 
We also analyze the potential distributional implications of a macro shock affecting the 
stock market instead of the housing market.  Consider, for instance, how a stock market decline 
of 10% would influence Boomer wealth. Even if we assume that all IRA assets are held in stock 
(in addition to direct stock holdings), only 2% of their wealth would be lost in this event.11 The 
drop in median wealth would be even smaller, only 1.1%.  Essentially the small impact is 
                                                 
99 For detail on this module and the questions we have inserted in it, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2006). 
10 Since this question is asked to older respondents, responses could simply reflect that (at least some) households 
have enough wealth for retirement and do not need to sell their house. In other words, answers to these questions 
may be influenced by the wealth households currently have. Unfortunately, we do not have data for young 
respondents. 
11 The study by Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) comes to a similar conclusion.  
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explained by the fact that most Boomers do not hold equities, and those who do, hold small 
amounts.  
Issues regarding business ownership 
Earlier research has shown that business owners are very different from other members of 
the population.12 As noted above, business owners are disproportionately found at the top of the 
wealth distribution and they are a very heterogeneous group. For example, 14% of business 
owners indicate they have no business equity, but median business equity is $50,000 and those at 
the very top hold as much as $20 million.  Moreover, business owners hold a great deal of wealth 
in their businesses; over 40% of them hold a quarter or more of their wealth in this form.13  
As in the case of housing, it is unclear whether business owners think of their business 
equity as an asset they will use to finance their retirement, and whether they plan to sell off their 
businesses when they retire. A large fraction of business owners explicitly state they will never 
retire completely (Hurst and Lusardi, 2006); since many business owners are self-employed, it is 
accordingly difficult to characterize exactly what “retirement” might entail for this group. There 
are also important measurement problems that arise when studying business owners. Tax evasion 
may drive some to underreport their income, and legal tax avoidance mechanisms can induce 
some owners to retain a portion of their compensation within their business.14  The percentage of 
business owners has fallen between the two cohorts, and so too has the share of total wealth 
                                                 
12 See Hurst and Lusardi (2004, 2006) and Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell and Torralba (2005). As Hurst and Lusardi 
(2004, 2006) have shown, business owners are more likely to be male, white, and married, and they also are more 
likely to come from families of business owners or highly educated families. They also have stronger ties with 
family and relatives; and they are more likely to have received and also to give money to family and relatives. Most 
importantly, business owners may display different motives to save than the rest of the population; they are not only 
much more likely to state they wish to leave a bequest to heirs but they are also less likely to be covered by 
pensions.  Business owners may also need to maintain large amounts of working capital both to deal with necessities 
of their business and to maintain effective control over the business.  Moreover, if households are compensated for 
taking greater risks with higher returns, it is again not surprising that business owners have higher wealth holdings 
than non-business owners. 
13 See also Gentry and Hubbard (2004). 
14 Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) also emphasize the many tax incentives in business ownership. 
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invested in business equity (Table 3).  Because we cannot fully account for all the nuances 
associated with business ownership, we exclude business owners in the multivariate analysis of 
savings. 
 
Planning and wealth 
One aspect of saving patterns that has received little attention to date is the fact that 
saving decisions are complex, requiring consumers to possess substantial economic knowledge 
and information. Our previous paper (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006) used a special module 
covering a subset of 2004 HRS respondents and demonstrated that only a small fraction (less 
than a one-third) of older respondents ever tried to figure out how much they needed to save for 
retirement. The fraction of older persons reporting they not only tried but actually succeeded in 
developing a saving plan is even smaller (18%).15  
One presumption of the theoretical life-cycle model of saving is that consumers are 
forward-looking and make plans for the future. To assess the empirical evidence for this point, 
we now focus on how much people have thought about retirement.  The wording of the question 
in the HRS is as follows: 
How much have you thought about retirement?  A lot, some, a little, or hardly at all? 
Results for both cohorts are presented in Table 4 (Panels A and B). As many as 28% of 
the early Boomers report that they have not thought about retirement at all, slightly fewer than 
the 32% in the 1992 HRS cohort.16 The fact that few people plan for retirement is also support by 
many other studies which show that older workers are woefully underinformed about their old-
                                                 
15 For additional evidence of lack of retirement planning, see Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003), Ameriks, Caplin and 
Leahy (2003) and Yakoboski and Dickemper (1997). 
16 Some households are not asked this question (for example, those who state they will never retire are not asked this 
question), so percentages refer to those who were asked. In our multivariate analysis, we add a dummy for this 
group of non-respondents. 
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age benefits. Indeed in the 1990s, only half of prior HRS cohorts could identify what type of 
pension plan they had (defined benefit, defined contribution, or hybrid) and fewer than half could 
identify when they would be eligible for early or normal retirement benefits (see also 
Mitchell,1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004). Information about Social Security is also scanty. 
Only two-fifths of earlier HRS respondents could venture a guess about their expected Social 
Security benefits and many respondents knew little about program rules; over half of current 
workers expect to become eligible for full Social Security benefits at younger ages than are 
actually feasible (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004; 2001 Employee Benefits Research Institute’s 
Retirement Confidence Survey). Overall, households are quite uninformed about many of the 
key variables that should enter well-reasoned saving plans (Bernheim, 1998). 
Also clear in Table 4 is the bimodal relationship between effort devoted to planning and 
household net worth. That is, those who report they undertook any planning – even “a little” – 
are much better off than those who said they planned “hardly at all.” In other words, undertaking 
even a little planning is associated with sizable wealth holdings, while non-planners display less 
wealth. The same pattern is present among the 1992 cohort. In other words, regardless of 
changes in home and stock prices, failure to plan for retirement for both cohorts is tantamount to 
having very little retirement savings. To highlight that planners hold substantially more wealth, 
we group households into two types: planners (those who have thought a lot, some, or a little 
about retirement) and non-planners (those who have thought hardly at all about retirement). At 
the median, planners hold double the amount of wealth of non-planners; differences are slightly 
less at the means. This is because there are a number of high-wealth households who do not plan 
for retirement.   
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We also find that nonplanners are disproportionately concentrated among the least 
educated, and among Blacks and Hispanics.17  As shown in Table 2, these groups are also those 
with the lowest wealth levels. Next, we show that planning may provide an explanation for the 
differences in wealth holdings and why some households arrive close to retirement with little or 
no wealth. 
Planning and financial literacy 
One reason people fail to plan is because they are financially unsophisticated.  Our prior 
research explored whether older respondents display basic financial literacy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2006). Those results are not encouraging: half the respondents surveyed in our module 
cannot make a simple calculation regarding interest rates over a 5-year period and do not know 
the difference between nominal and real interest rates. An even larger percentage of respondents 
do not know that holding a single company stock is riskier than holding a stock mutual fund. 
To pursue this question further in the present context we turn to the 2004 HRS, where 
respondents are presented with several questions that we use to assess financial and political 
literacy. 18 Three financial literacy questions are asked, as follows: 
1) “If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how many people out of 1,000 would 
be expected to get the disease”? 
 
2) “If 5 people all have the winning number in the lottery and the prize is 2 million 
dollars, how much will each of them get?” 
 
For respondents who give the correct answer to either the first or the second question, the 
following question is then asked: 
                                                 
17 For brevity, tables are not reported. For a detailed analysis of planning across cohorts and demographic groups, 
see Lusardi and Beeler (2006). 
18 Questions are also available on respondents’ success at counting backward and subtracting 7 from 100 five times. 
The answers to these calculations are highly correlated with the questions we take up in the text. Because these 
questions do not refer to economic calculations, we have not included them in our empirical analysis. 
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3) “Let’s say you have 200 dollars in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent 
interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two years?” 
 
For each case, if the respondent gets the answer correctly, we set the answer equal to 1, and 0 
otherwise. These are recoded as “Percentage Calculation,” “Lottery Division,” and “Compound 
Interest” variables respectively.  We also define a “Political Literacy” variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent correctly knows the names of the US President and Vice President; this is likely to 
capture respondents’ awareness of future tax and macroeconomic prospects.19  
Table 5 summarizes how this group of Boomers answered the economic and political 
literacy questions.  While more than 80% got the percentage calculation right, only about half 
got the lottery division right. Only 18% could correctly compute compound interest; of those 
who got the compound interest wrong, 43% undertook a simple interest calculation thereby 
overlooking the interest which accrues on both principal and interest.  Also note that a fifth of the 
sample could not name either the US President or Vice President.20 
Further detail on financial literacy appears in Figure 2, which reports the distribution of 
correct responses for respondents in different educational and racial/ethnic groups. For all four 
measures, literacy rises steeply with education: the more educated are much more likely to 
answer the economic and political literacy queries correctly. These differences are statistically 
significant. Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to answer correctly than Whites (again 
differences are statistically significant), which may not be surprising as the former groups report 
lower wealth levels. Nevertheless, there are also sharp cross-question variations. For instance, all 
three racial/ethnic groups score over 50% on the percentage calculation, and all three score low 
                                                 
19 These questions were asked only of respondents who entered the sample in 2004, so we lose approximately 600 
observations when we consider these data. 
20 Similar results about lack of financial literacy are reported by Bernheim (1985, 1988), Hogarth and Hilgert 
(2002), Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly (2003), Moore (2003), Mandell (2004), and the National Council on Economic 
Education (2005). 
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on the compound interest question. These findings suggest that the HRS questions may be able to 
capture different types of financial savvy.  
Table 6 reports Probit estimates of the effect of literacy on planning (being a planner is 
defined, as mentioned before, as having thought about retirement a little, some, or a lot). Across 
the board, financial literacy is important for planning. The most important variable, 
quantitatively, is the one reflecting knowledge of interest compounding, which makes sense 
inasmuch as it is critical for saving plans. It is also worth disaggregating those who answer 
correctly, those who answer incorrectly, and those who do not know the answers, so we can 
distinguish between knowledge versus lack thereof. People who are unable to divide the lottery 
winnings are less likely to be planners, and the effect is quantitatively important. Moreover, the 
knowledge of interest compounding and the inability to do simple calculations still have an 
impact on planning, even after accounting for demographic factors including education, race, 
marital status, number of children, retirement status, and sex.  
The role of planning in retirement wealth accumulation 
By influencing planning patterns, financial literacy may influence household saving 
outcomes. Several explanations might account for the empirical observation that planning is 
associated with higher retirement wealth. For instance, planning may be a proxy for personal 
attributes such as patience, diligence, or other factors associated with having a low discount rate 
– which are also likely to be associated with wealth.  In this case, one might anticipate that 
controlling for socio-economic and demographic characteristics in multivariate wealth 
regressions would produce a cleaner estimate of the planning effect. To investigate the 
importance of this explanation in our dataset, we examine whether the positive relationship 
between levels of wealth and planning described in Table 4 persists after controlling for factors 
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conventionally thought to determine wealth.  Here we focus on total net worth and also on non-
housing, non-business wealth; in addition we examine housing wealth in view of the widespread 
pattern of homeownership and the importance of housing in total wealth.  We drop business 
owners from the sample and trim the bottom and top 1% of the wealth distribution to exclude 
outliers. 
Our empirical strategy in Table 7 first controls for the conventional determinants of 
wealth likely to be associated with household permanent income and preferences. These include 
variables measuring respondents’ educational attainment, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, age, 
number of children, retirement status (whether fully or partly retired), and household income (in 
natural logs).21  Our strategy then adds to this canonical set of regressors a new determinant of 
wealth, namely the respondent’s self-report of whether he is a planner. The test we perform is 
whether planning is associated with wealth outcomes after controlling for the conventional 
factors associated with saving.  Further, by pooling the EBB and 1992 HRS samples, we can 
examine the effect of planning over time. The year dummy and the interaction between the year 
and the planner dummy test whether the wealth/planning relationship is changing over time. 
Inasmuch as wealth distributions are skewed, we perform both OLS and median regressions. 
The estimates in Table 7 show that planning is strongly positively associated with higher 
total net worth in this multivariate framework. Thus, planning continues to have an effect on 
wealth, even after accounting for many demographic factors. The planning effect in columns 1-2 
is sizable and does not change across cohorts: the median regression estimates indicate that those 
who plan accumulate close to 20% more total net worth, while the mean regressions indicate that 
those who plan accumulate 13% more wealth. For non-housing wealth (columns 3-4), the impact 
is larger; the median and mean estimates indicate that planners accumulate 32% and 19% more 
                                                 
21 Taking the log of income downweights outliers. 
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wealth respectively. Turning to home equity (columns 5-6), we note that those who plan 
accumulate 16% more wealth in home equity (median estimates). Other variables have the 
impacts that might be anticipated: both education and race/ethnicity remain strongly associated 
with wealth levels.  Specifically, those with at least some college have far more wealth than 
those who did not complete high school, and Blacks have far less wealth than Whites, all else 
equal. Married couples have higher wealth and so do high income households, other factors 
constant.22  
Does planning affect wealth or does wealth affect planning? 
These estimates confirm that planners accumulate larger amounts of wealth than 
nonplanners. But if planning is correlated with unobservable character traits which cannot 
readily be controlled for, the measured planning effect might not be a true measure of the causal 
relationship we seek to assess.  While this argument has some theoretical merit, it does not match 
findings from other studies. For example, Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003) adds a long list of controls 
to wealth regressions to proxy for individual characteristics. She also adds subjective 
expectations about Social Security, house prices, and expected retirement ages. Her estimates of 
planning remain positive and statistically significant. Moreover, when she instruments for 
planning using the difference between the respondent’s age and the age of his older siblings (a 
measure of planning costs), she concludes that the planning effects are again positive and 
statistically significant but even larger. Similar findings are offered by Ameriks, Caplin and 
Leahy (2003). 
 Another possible confound is that planning may reduce uncertainty concerning future 
asset returns and future income. However, this works in the “wrong” direction, in that less 
                                                 
22 We have also tried different empirical specifications. For example, we added controls for risk aversion and 
controls for subjective expectations about longevity and Social Security. Our main results remain unchanged and for 
brevity, we do not include these results in the table. 
 17
uncertainty should lead to less rather than more wealth as the precautionary saving motive 
decreases. Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003) have data on measures of subjective uncertainty 
about income in their TIAA-CREF survey, but find little evidence that planners display lower 
subjective uncertainty concerning future income. 
Yet another way in which planning may affect wealth is via portfolio choice.  For 
instance, the financially and politically illiterate, who are less likely to plan, may also be unlikely 
to invest in high-return or tax-favored assets. This would lead to low savings, if combined with 
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution less than one. This view is consistent with Lusardi’s 
(2003) evidence that planning increases stock ownership. 
A different explanation about how planning might affect wealth is addressed by 
psychological research on self-control. If consumers want to save but simply lack the self-
discipline to do so, planning might help consumers control their consumption (Ameriks, Caplin, 
Leahy, and Taylor, 2004).  Related work by Gollwitzer (1996, 1999) demostrates experimentally 
that people are more likely to achieve goals and translate their intentions into actions when they 
develop concrete plans. One striking finding from the psychological research is that a simple 
planning activity, such as getting experimental subjects to write down the specific steps they will 
take to implement a task, can greatly increase follow-through. These successes may help explain 
why merely thinking about retirement can produce wide differences in retirement wealth. 
Moreover, it may explain the bimodal distribution of wealth observed in Table 4, and why even 
“a little” or “some” planning generates large wealth differences, as compared to those who did 
not think about retirement at all. 
Nevertheless, the causality may go the other way: for instance, wealthier households may 
plan more because they have more to gain by planning. On the other hand, wealthier households 
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might not plan because they do not need to; they may already have enough for retirement. To 
assess the possible importance of such reverse causality in our sample of households nearing 
retirement, we first examine a regression where the dependent variable is being a planner, and 
then control for the same variables as examined previously in Table 7, with the addition of 
wealth. OLS estimates in Table 8 indicate that the scope for such a reverse causality effect is 
small: indeed, a wealth increase of $1,000 would be interpreted as boosting the probability of 
planning only by less than 0.1 percentage point.   
A further test must consider “exogenous” variations in wealth. In other words, we require 
an instrumental variable which is uncorrelated with unmeasured unobservables in the error term 
but correlated with wealth.  We believe that an ideal instrument to assess the impact of wealth on 
planning is available from the housing market. In both 1992 and 2004, there were substantial 
changes in the housing market: in 1992, the economy was at the end of a housing price bust, 
whereas in 2004, the economy experienced a housing boom. In both instances, regional housing 
prices changed substantially across the US, creating changes in household wealth for reasons 
unrelated to individual unobservable characteristics. As an example, home prices rose between 
2003 and 2004 by 10.3% in the Pacific region, but only 3.6% in the South. In 1992, the housing 
bust was particularly pronounced in New England, and less serious elsewhere. Accordingly, we 
use as an instrument for wealth the regional housing price changes in the previous year (2003-04 
for the EBB; 1991-92 for the 1992 HRS cohort).  We also note that changes in home prices 
affect more than home equity values; with the development of home equity lines of credit, 
increased home equity can easily be accessed by households.23  
                                                 
23 Hurst and Stafford (1994) document that households are willing to borrow (and lenders willing to lend) when 
capital gains on housing rise. 
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Regional housing price changes are a good predictor of respondents’ net worth. The first-
stage estimate of housing price changes is +12.729 with a standard error of 1.483; this implies 
that a 1% housing price increase raised wealth by over $12,000.24  Yet the instrumental variable 
estimates in Table 8 reveal that the effect of wealth on planning is not statistically significant. 
Considering each cohort separately, the effect of wealth is either statistically insignificant or 
negative. In other words, when people grow wealthier, they tend to plan less (and some wealthy 
households do not plan at all).25 This underscores the fact that the OLS estimates of planning on 
wealth reported in Table 7 most likely underestimate the full effect of planning on wealth. 
 
Conclusions   
This paper takes several new steps in linking workers’ financial literacy to their success 
at retirement planning and their accumulation of retirement wealth.  First, we compare the net 
worth of the early Baby Boomer cohort in 2004 with that of another cohort of the same age (51-
56) in another period of time (1992). We find that Boomers have higher levels of net worth than 
the previous cohort, principally because they hold more housing wealth. We also identify key 
differences in the distribution of wealth and conclude that the poorest Boomers are actually 
worse off than their earlier counterparts. The fact that wealth is very low for Blacks, and 
Hispanics, and the least educated did not change over time. In part this may be due to low levels 
of financial literacy among these groups. 
Second, we show that respondents who report they planned for retirement enter their 
golden years with higher wealth levels. We further show that planning is strongly correlated with 
financial and political literacy and that the relationship between planning and wealth remains 
                                                 
24 When we perform this regression in each year separately, we find that the first-stage estimate of housing price 
changes is +18.619 (s.e. 2.562) in 2004 and -2.936 (s.e. 1.626) in 1992.  
25 See Lusardi and Beeler (2006) for detail. 
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strong, even after controlling for many sociodemographic factors. We explore the possibility that 
it is wealth that affects planning rather than planning that affects wealth, but our statistical tests 
indicate this is not the case.  
We believe that our research findings are particularly relevant in the current policy 
environment. For some time there has been substantial employer interest regarding ways to 
enhance worker retirement security. To this end, some firms have offered their employees 
retirement seminars (Lusardi, 2004), and financial advice provision has been made more feasible 
by the new Pension Protection Act of 2006.  While some contend that such programs cannot do 
much to enhance retirement savings, our analysis implies that planning can actually jump-start 
the retirement saving process. A one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to do much to build 
retirement wealth, and education programs must be targeted specifically to particular subgroups. 
Nevertheless, differences in planning behavior do help explain why household retirement assets 
differ, and why some people cross the retirement threshold with very low (or no) wealth. 
As recently noted by Campbell (2006), it is often difficult for consumers to exhibit 
carefully-reasoned and informed economic decisions:  
“[F]or many households, the discrepancies between observed and ideal 
behavior have relatively minor consequences and can easily be rationalized by 
small frictions that are ignored in standard finance theory. For a minority of 
households, however, particularly poorer and less educated households, there 
are larger discrepancies with potentially serious consequences.”   
 
Our findings provide support for this statement and highlight the fact that specific groups in the 
economy, particularly those with low education, low income and Black and Hispanic households, 
are at risk of not preparing adequately for their retirement. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Total Net Worth and Wealth Components ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004 (N=2,635) 
 
Percentile Total  
Net Worth ($) 
 
Housing  
Equity ($) 
 
Non-housing Non- 
business Wealth ($) 
5th -3,500 0 -8,850 
10th 100 0 -300 
25th 36,000 7,000 7,000 
 
50th 
 
152,000 
 
68,000 
 
47,500 
75th 400,000 160,000 190,200 
90th 891,000 300,000 534,000 
95th 1,327,000 430,000 886,000 
Mean 387,690 127,280 220,700 
Std Dev. 960,350 296,200 674,500 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992 (N= 4,580) 
 
Percentile Total  
Net Worth ($) 
 
Housing  
Equity ($) 
 
Non-housing Non- 
business Wealth ($) 
5th 0 0 -1,890 
10th 1,350 0 0 
25th 40,660 6,730 8,750 
 
50th 
 
136,260 
 
60,590 
 
49,140 
75th 315,060 121,180 162,240 
90th 700,130 215,420 420,080 
95th 1,218,500 290,820 768,800 
Mean 327,650 88,560 184,230 
Std Dev. 737,950 146,400 496,310 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.  
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Table 2: Total Net Worth by Demographic Group ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004  (N=2,635) 
 
Group 25th Percentile Median  Mean  
 
75th  
Percentile 
N  
Education 
   < HS 3 21,400 100,380 78,000 327 
  HS Graduate 15,374 88,500 215,637 243,000 745 
  Some College 34,000 133,000 278,665 319,085 757 
College Graduate 140,000 302,000 664,197 691,000 448 
  >College 168,000 365,000 786,232 845,000 358 
Race 
   White 62,800 199,000 457,850 463,000 1,741 
   Black 0 25,000 120,351 115,000 454 
   Hispanic 5,000 55,800 176,718 200,000 186 
   Other  9,000 70,000 236,852 250,000 254 
Marital Status 
   Married 85,000 223,000 499,557 498,000 1,622 
   Non-Married 2,750 52,500 201,313 199,000 1,013 
Children 
   None 26,000 122,300 366,596 370,000 316 
   Some  37,000 157,000 390,836 404,000 2,319 
Sex 
   Male 55,000 194,000 485,898 481,000 1,346 
   Female 20,000 104,000 271,358 297,500 1,289 
Income 
   1st Quartile 25 20,000 103,119 89,500 749 
   2nd Quartile 31,000 95,000 190,163 223,200 683 
   3rd Quartile 95,000 194,000 317,214 379,010 610 
   4th Quartile 240,000 462,700 939,941 991,000 593 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992 (N= 4,580) 
 
Group 25th 
Percentile 
Median  Mean  
 
75th  
Percentile 
N  
Education 
  < HS 1,346 41,065 147,057 118,483 1,007 
 HS Graduate 39,719 121,176 242,715 256,489 1,740 
Some College 67,051 166,954 363,286 352,084 926 
  College Graduate 117,137 257,163 516,428 556,467 479 
   >College 149,451 291,361 687,753 706,860 428 
Race 
   White 60,588 166,550 377,153 368,241 3,221 
   Black 337 36,487 109,963 115,117 814 
   Hispanic 2,693 46,047 108,162 126,562 414 
   Other  1,077 151,470 250,052 297,555 131 
Marital Status 
   Married 72,706 173,686 385,171 376,319 3,310 
   Non-Married 2,558 51,836 183,899 172,339 1,270 
Children 
   None 32,987 130,601 369,600 309,672 378 
   Some  41,604 136,781 323,603 315,058 4,202 
Sex 
   Male 58,568 166,954 398,210 368,914 2,500 
   Female 20,869 102,326 238,805 249,263 2,080 
Income 
   1st Quartile 942 27,534 111,810 101,047 1,266 
   2nd Quartile 41,065 102,024 198,969 219,463 1,174 
   3rd Quartile 89,266 170,320 295,801 316,404 1,112 
   4th Quartile 165,473 329,195 703,614 667,142 1,028 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.  
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Table 3: Asset Ownership and Percentage of Wealth Accounted for by Each Asset 
(%) 
 
Group Home  Real 
Estate  
Stock IRA Own  
Business 
% with Asset Ownership 
1992 78.6 24.8 30.6 40.6 19.0 
2004 79.9 17.1 30.9 41.5 14.7 
t-stat of diff 
  (p value) 
1.34 
(0.18) 
-7.95 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.75) 
0.79 
(0.43) 
-4.77 
(0.00) 
% of Net Worth Accounted For By That Asset 
1992 27.0 16.8 8.3 7.5 16.7 
2004 32.8 14.2 12.1 10.6 10.2 
 
Note: All data are weighted using HRS household weights. N in 1992 = 4,577; in 2004 = 2,635. 
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Table 4: Distribution of Net Worth by Planning ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004 
 
Group % of 
Sample 
25th Percentile
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
75th Percentile
Planning 
Hardly at  
All 
27.9% 9,000 79,000 315,579 271,000 
A Little 
 
17.0% 62,800 173,400 356,552 390,500 
Some 
 
27.7% 51,000 189,000 365,354 447,200 
A Lot 
 
27.4% 54,000 199,000 517,252 470,000 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992  
 
Group % of 
Sample 
25th Percentile Median Mean 75th Percentile
Planning 
Hardly at  
All 
32.0 10,100 76,910 224,3110 200,610 
A Little 
 
14.3 37,700 126,560 343,110 292,170 
Some 
 
24.8 71,360 172,340 340,340 367,300 
A Lot 
 
28.9 71,390 173,690 353,520 356,800 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.  
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Table 5:  Financial Literacy Among Early Baby Boomers  
(N=1,984) 
 
Question Type Correct (%) Incorrect (%) Do Not Know (%) 
Percentage 
Calculation 
83.5 13.2 2.8 
 
Lottery 
Division 
55.9 34.4 8.7 
 
Compound 
Interest* 
17.8 78.5 3.2 
Political 
Literacy 
81.1 11.0 7.7 
 
Notes: * Conditional on being asked the question.  The percentages do not sum to 100 due to a very small 
fraction of respondents who refused to answer the literacy questions. All data weighted using HRS 
household weights.  
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Table 6:  Probit Analysis of the Effect of Financial Literacy on Planning  
Marginal Effects Reported (N=1,716)  
 
 Planners 
 
 1 2 3 
Correct Percentage Calculation 
 
-.016 
(.061) 
-.012 
(.062) 
-.034 
(.060) 
Correct Lottery Division 
 
.059* 
(.030) 
.034 
(.031) 
.001 
(.032) 
Correct Compound Interest 
 
.153*** 
(.035) 
.149*** 
(.035) 
.114*** 
(.039) 
Correct Political Literacy 
 
.104*** 
(.032) 
.084** 
(.040) 
.016 
(.042) 
DK Percentage Calculation 
 
 .021 
(.068) 
.054 
(.067) 
DK Lottery Division 
 
 -.154*** 
(.050) 
-.141*** 
(.051) 
DK Compound Interest 
 
 -.114 
(.080) 
-.073 
(.081) 
DK Political Literacy 
 
 -.019 
(.053) 
-.016 
(.054) 
Demographic controls No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 .031 .038 .074 
 
Note:  Sample includes EBB members who responded to financial literacy question. Other controls include 
age, education, race, sex, marital status, retirement status, number of children. All regressions include a 
dummy for those who were not asked the question about interest compounding. DK indicates respondents 
who did not know the answer. All data weighted using HRS household weights. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Total Net Worth, Non-housing Wealth, and Home Equity on Planning 
Pooled Sample, EBB and 1992 HRS 
 
      Net Worth         Non-housing Wealth    Home Equity    
  Median Regression OLS   Median Regression OLS   Median Regression OLS_________ 
 
Planning 21.995***  30.180**  12.631***  24.788**  8.701***  5.392 
  (6.014)   (12.326)  (2.179)   (9.778)   (2.519)   (5.335) 
Year2004 7.968   41.552***  0.476   16.789*  7.367**  24.763*** 
  (7.320)   (12.009)  (2.660)   (9.526)   (3.058)   (5.197) 
Plan*Year04 -0.967   5.949   -2.926   9.512   -0.448   -3.563 
  (9.070)   (14.897)  (3.290)   (11.817)  (3.796)   (6.447) 
High Sch 10.769   17.748   3.627   10.034   3.388   7.714 
  (7.120)   (11.801)  (2.577)   (9.361)   (2.954)   (5.107) 
Some Coll 23.965***  34.443***  10.766***  21.087**  7.862**  13.356** 
  (7.943)   (12.614)  (2.882)   (10.006)  (3.300)   (5.459) 
College 103.072***  150.674***  61.242***  93.442***  31.766***  57.232*** 
  (9.631)   (14.696)  (3.501)   (11.657)  (4.027)   (6.360) 
More Coll 145.688***  218.180***  82.859***  144.204***  46.969***  73.976*** 
  (10.360)  (15.486)  (3.756)   (12.284)  (4.320)   (6.702) 
Hispanic -13.600*  -34.615**  -8.038***  -21.595**  -6.442*  -13.020** 
  (8.034)   (13.540)  (2.936)   (10.740)  (3.388)   (5.860) 
Black  -35.579***  -71.863***  -14.184***  -41.510***  -18.091***  -30.353*** 
  (6.586)   (11.019)  (2.379)   (8.741)   (2.746)   (4.769) 
Female -1.209   -5.095   -4.973**  -7.257   -0.578   2.162 
  (5.310)   (7.610)   (1.932)   (6.037)   (2.221)   (3.293) 
Ln income 44.349***  67.538***  17.368***  46.888***  17.560***  20.650*** 
  (2.840)   (3.969)   (1.041)   (3.148)   (1.205)   (1.718) 
Constant -503.476***  -764.305***  -219.109***  -572.005***  -202.902***  -192.300*** 
  (45.805)  (67.952)  (16.867)  (53.903)  (19.481)  (29.409) 
 
Adj.  R2    0.16     0.24     0.10     0.18      0.13       0.17 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is divided by 1,000. Other controls include age, marital status, retirement status, number of children, a dummy 
for other race, and a dummy for those who are not asked the planning question. All data weighted using HRS household weights. Stars indicates levels of significance.   
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Table 8:  Estimates of Planning on Net Worth: OLS and Instrumental Variables 
Regressions  
Pooled Sample, EBB and 1992 HRS (N=5,857) 
 
 OLS estimate IV estimate 
Net Worth  0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00008 
(0.0002) 
   
Hausman Test (P-Value) 
 
 0.59 
(0.44) 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and IV regressions of planning on total net worth (net worth divided by 1,000.)  Standard 
errors in parenthesis with p-value in parenthesis for Hausman test. All data weighted using HRS household weights.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Figure 1:  Reported Probability of Selling House to Finance Retirement: EBB Respondents 
2004 
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All data weighted using HRS household weights. 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2: Financial Literacy by Education and Race/Ethnicity: EBB Respondents (2004) 
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Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights. 
 
 
 
 
